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A bst rac t Electronic Health Records are key components to an efficient
exploitation of information technologies in health care institutions. Nev-
ertheless, several barriers that hinder its wide adoption subsists. The
co-existence of dissimilar and incompatible health information systems
and the absence of a unique central repository for personal medical data
are some examples. This paper, we propose a web-based health records
repository that allow citizens to have a unique virtual card that inte-
grates all their personal clinical data. Privacy policies and the access
control mechanisms are also discussed.
Resumo Os registos me´dicos electro´nicos sa˜o fundamentais para uma
utilizac¸a˜o eficiente das tecnologias de informac¸a˜o em instituic¸o˜es de sau´de.
No entanto, existem va´rias barreiras que atrasam a sua implementac¸a˜o
em larga escala. A co-existeˆncia de sistemas de informac¸a˜o de sau´de
d´ıspares e incompat´ıveis, bem como a falta de um reposito´rio central de
informac¸a˜o me´dica pessoal, sa˜o alguns dos exemplos. Propomos um repo-
sito´rio me´dico, baseado em tecnologia web, disponibiliza aos cidada˜os um
carta˜o virtual u´nico que agrega toda a sua informac¸a˜o me´dica. Questo˜es
relacionadas com a privacidade e mecanismos de controlo de acesso sa˜o
tambe´m abordados.
1 Int roduct ion
T he use of Information Technologies (I T ) to support health care services is a
reality commonly spread in the society. Nevertheless, one of the biggest chal-
lenges in the health informatics is st ill the creation of an Integrated E lectronic
Health Record (I E H R) - a patient longitudinal record that aggregates all gen-
erated information in clinical consultat ions. T he balance between privacy and
accessibili ty issues is one of the reasons that makes health care a rich scenario
for security technologies [8]. On one hand, we must enforce the privacy of sen-
sible information and, on the other, the quality of healthcare services demands
sharing and remote access to patient information [9,7].
T he I E H R is an important tool that clinicians can use to be bet ter informed
about patients' medical history. Due to changes in ci t izens way of living, i t's
normal one person to have several clinical appointments in diÞerent ci t ies, re-
gions and even countries. Cit izens move their residence during lifet ime, travel
more regularly, for working, for leisure or even for medical care [12]. Hence,
the information generated will be disperse along several inst i tut ional informa-
tion systems. A unique view of the disperse E H R , would improve the quality
of healthcare services. To create an integrated access to the information that is
disperse amount several systems, a single patient identiþer should be necessary
to simplify the aggregation of medical data. However, this isn't a straight forward
task since each patient may have diÞerent identiþers in various systems.
As the information is spread in several organizations, i ts sharing has to re-
spect rigid laws and regulations that makes di Ž cult the I E H R implementation.
O ther di Ž culty is based on the lack of well established communication standards
between diÞerent E H Rs systems, despite some eÞorts [11].
2 Materials and methods
In most scenarios, the regulatory and law framework for sharing health records
can be satisþed imposing the patient informed consent (several models use this
approach [5,1,3]). As the patient is entit led to request a copy of i ts records and
share with anyone that he decides, the sharing is make using his consent instead
of the organization that stores the records.
In those heterogeneous environment , involving diÞerent organizations, public
or private, a secure authentication mechanism is mandatory. In the last decade,
the use of smart-cards in healthcare information systems has been consensual,
as they provide a secure way for storing information and authentication cre-
dentials for remote authentication [6]. T he E lectronic Health Card (E H C) is
basically a smart-card that is used for saving useful information for adminis-
trat ive tasks, emergency medical information, security cert iþcates and, in some
cases, e-prescript ions. T his type of tokens are used in some countries like, for
instance, Germany and Austria to achieve a national I E H R solution.
As discussed, the I E H R implementations needs to provide an integrated ac-
cess mechanism to disperse information. So, the integrator system must know
the data location, more precisely the query engine service to extract informa-
tion of a speciþc patient . T his linkage information can be stored in the integrator
database, however some projects decided to extend electronic health card to sup-
port that service. Hence, the V irtual Unique E lectronic Patient Card ( V U-E P R)
appears as a possible solution [4].
T he V U-E P R is based on a token containing card-owner resident clinic-admin
information, as well as structured references to its electronic records. T he smart
card securely contains this reference structured data set . T he implementation of
Public K eys Cryptography and Crypto Smart Cards, unequivocally provides a
way to securely store, transport and access the card-owner information. More-
over, i t also grants the owner full control over the access to its data, through a
Pin and /or biometric registrat ion. F inally, i t also allows the card-owner to enti-
t le information access levels to other users such as the clinical professionals. T he
main beneþts associated to this solution can be characterized by highly scat tered
geographical storage requirements. T his model empowers patient enabling the
discret ionary access to remote data, when crossed V U-E P R card with health pro-
fessional card, and allows an open access to the medical emergency data stored
in the card. Upon this model, we developed a V U-E PR solution named Multi-
Service Patient Data Card (MS-P D C). T he MS-P D C was modeled to provide
þve complementary services and results from an extension of a þrst developed
( V U-E P R) model exclusively oriented to E lectronic Patient Records [5,4] infor-
mation: i) Administrat ive data support; ii) Emergency C linical data support;
iii) Hyperlink base, build upon the U R L schema and that allow to link the pa-
tient clinical and genet ic distributed information; iv) Patient digital credentials
support and management; v) P D C owner veriþcation capabili ty.
T he MS-P D C uses U R Ls to fetch the information on the disperse systems
and present them to the user as a unique view of all distributed data. T his
model copes well with mobili ty issues, such as the gathering of disperse data
and controlling the access to it . Nevertheless, in a wider concept of mobili ty it's
not feasible that all patients will hold the same type of card world-widely. O ther
discussable aspect is the need of the presence of the physical card in the system
whenever exists the need to access the patient E H R . T hus, we propose a model
where a system will hold the card in behalf of the user.
3 Results
T he V irtual Health Card System ( V H CS) proposed, appears as a solution to
overcome the drawbacks associated with physical token dependency. Instead of
the E H C being hold by the patient ( F igure 1), i t will be hold by a service
( F igure 2). T he service will store and provide access to the E H C when requested
and only if the authorization is granted by the predeþned policies. T herefore the
information can be used after patient informed consent , since the links to the
information will be on the system. T he informed consent will be also stored in the
card, visible to other system components that can read it and apply that policies
controlling the access to the patient information. Moreover, other important
advantages could be identiþed in this proposal. F irst , i t expedite the processes
of backup and revalidation of credentials. Secondly, an important issue, i t allows
the dynamic update of links on the patient card whenever new information is
created. Most of this features became available due to the continuos presence of
the card in the system( F igure 2).
T his approach will permit the disassociat ion between the credentials used
by users in system authentication and the credentials used inside the system.
For accessing to his E H C , the user will authenticate using a token. T he system
is su Ž ciently  exible to support diÞerent tokens including the new Portuguese
Cit izen Card, an electronic identiþcation card (eID card) that contains a cert iþ-
cate for authentication. Moreover, if the user token or eID is lost or stolen, the
system can temporary block the access to the V irtual Health Card until the new
token be available and associated to a patient V irtual Health Card.
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Our proposed model ( F igure 3) is composed by 4 main components: the cre-
dentials, the access policy and two types of Universal Unique Identiþers (U UIDs).
T he credential component is responsible for securely storing the private and pub-
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lic key of the user. T he access to the private-key container is only available to
the authenticated user (the actor), by the way of a secret (could be a password
or other method [2]). T he private-key inside the container is the credential that
will be used internally for authentication, signing, cypher and de-cypher the in-
formation. T his modus operandi separates the credentials for authentication in
the system from the credentials that the user will use to logon.
In access policy component , the patient deþnes the informed consent to his in-
formation, identifying healthcare professional and granting speciþc permissions.
Each new entry is signed with the patient's private-key. Hence, each time a sys-
tem component makes a request to access the patient information, the system
checks if the request ing user has the necessary privileges (through the access
policy), verifying always if the policy was really signed by the patient .
T he U UIDs represent indexes to the disperse patient information. T he V H CS
use this information to create an unique view of i t I E H R . T hese universal unique
identiþers will work as links to the remote information. Moreover, each link has
also complementary information about access mechanisms (or services). T he
system provides two types of U UIDs spaces, enabling a patient private links area
(i.e. U UID Private) to have information that only him can reference and other
area (U UID Protected) where are placed the references accessible to speciþc
healthcare professionals.
T he Private U UID may be used to handle references of very sensible and
discriminatory information. On this component , the patient can manage the
information that he does not want accessible to any health professionals, in any
occasion. To enforce this behavior, the system will cypher the references with the
users correspondent public-key forcing that only with the private-key of the user
this information could be read. T he access to this private information demands
always the explici t patient consent .
T he Protected U UID is the place where other system components (or exter-
nal services) can update the U UIDs, as new information is being produced in
several health systems. Components that in the behalf of an authenticated and
authorized user want to access the patient's information, query this component
to get information about remote patient data location and how to access i t .
T he credential component will ensure that only an authorized user can access
his private-key and that Private U UIDs will only be accessible using the correct
private-key that is stored inside the credential component . I t's also propose that
the Protected U UID and the Access Policy be cyphered using a system key, that
must be shared between the components that need to communicate with the
V H CS. T herefore a component is obligated to register in the system to obtain
the access key.
In a emergency scenario, the patient could not be able to provide the intend
consent . T he V H CS is prepared to handle this si tuation granting the pract i-
t ioner access to the patient E H R and bypassing the access policy for the U UID
Protected. T his " break-the-glass " mechanism will only give access to informa-
tion that isn't protect in the private area (U UID Private component). T his
mechanism will generate audit ing records for future analyze and detect ion of
misconducted access.
T he V H CS proposal provides an important indexing and retrieve service of
disperse information and the access control mechanisms to ensure the patient
data privacy and conþdentiali ty. I t will also enable users to have an unique
authentication in the system, providing a single-sign-on behavior. T his service
will present the user credentials to other components as needed.
4 Conclusions
T he proposed model copes well with requirements of mobile ci t izens E H Rs, i t
separate the credentials used for authentication from the credentials used in
the indexing system. I t enables the creation of a dynamic mechanism to up-
date references of remote patient information. I t also copes with the existence
of diÞerent identiþers for the same patient , along diÞerent healthcare systems.
Moreover, i t empowers patients with the capabili ty to decide what information
is absolutely private from all the information that exists in the disperse E H Rs.
F inally, i t implements an informed consent mechanism that respects the regula-
tory framework for sharing of healthcare records between dist inct professionals
(or inst i tut ions) in diÞerent regions or countries.
Further work will be need namely to decide how to implement the access
control policy. T he idea is to have a central R B A C policy database [10] that
deþnes the permissions for each role like, for example, the permissions to a prac-
t i t ioner or the permissions to a nurse. W ith the central R B A C policy database
the patient only have to decide which role he grants to each professional proþle
in the access policy component .
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